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Abstract Physical cognition has generally been assessed
in tool-using species that possess a relatively large brain
size, such as corvids and apes. Parrots, like corvids and
apes, also have large relative brain sizes, yet although
parrots rarely use tools in the wild, growing evidence
suggests comparable performances on physical cognition
tasks. It is, however, unclear whether success on such tasks
is facilitated by previous experience and training proce-
dures. We therefore investigated physical comprehension
of object relationships in two non-tool-using species of
captive neotropical parrots on a new means-end paradigm,
the Trap-Gaps task, using unfamiliar materials and modi-
fied training procedures that precluded procedural cues.
Red-shouldered macaws (Diopsittaca nobilis) and black-
headed caiques (Pionites melanocephala) were presented
with an initial task that required them to discriminate
between pulling food trays through gaps while attending to
the respective width of the gaps and size of the trays.
Subjects were then presented with a novel, but functionally
equivalent, transfer task. Six of eight birds solved the initial
task through trial-and-error learning. Four of these six birds
solved the transfer task, with one caique demonstrating
spontaneous comprehension. These findings suggest that
non-tool-using parrots may possess capacities for sophis-
ticated physical cognition by generalising previously
learned rules across novel problems.
Keywords Physical cognition  Parrots  Means-end 
Causal reasoning  Behavioural flexibility  Tool-use 
Trap-Gaps
Introduction
The comprehension of object relationships has typically
been assessed using both vertical string-pulling and hor-
izontal means-end problems. Vertical string-pulling tasks
typically require subjects to discriminate between strings
that are either connected, or disconnected, to an otherwise
out-of-reach reward. Subjects then perform potentially
novel and coordinated motor actions to pull up the string
to obtain the reward, and their performances may improve
with experience. While numerous species of birds have
been tested on vertical string-pulling tasks (Jacobs and
Osvath 2015), only budgerigars, Melopsittacus undulates
(Ducker and Rensch 1977), parrots (Krasheninnikova
et al. 2013; Schuck-Paim et al. 2009; Werdenich and
Huber 2006) and corvids (Heinrich 1995; Heinrich and
Bugnyar 2005) show an ability to rapidly, if not sponta-
neously, solve more complicated configurations of this
task, such as correctly discriminating between rewarded,
rather than unrewarded crossed strings and broken strings,
as well as discriminating between pulling strings based on
the perceived effort required to retrieve a reward (Pfuhl
2012).
Horizontal means-end discrimination tasks, by contrast,
are often used to assess physical cognition in primates,
typically by presenting subjects with a binary choice
between a functional and a non-functional tool or a plat-
form, with rewards placed at the distal ends of each option
(Hauser et al. 1999; Povinelli 2000; Yamazaki et al. 2011).
However, a variety of species, such as dogs (Mu¨ller et al.
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2014) and elephants (Irie-Sugimoto et al. 2008), also show
capacities to solve this problem. While non-human great
apes essentially demonstrate spontaneous comprehension
of horizontal means-end problems (Herrmann et al. 2008;
Mulcahy et al. 2013), yellow-crowned parakeets,
Cyanoramphus auriceps (Funk 2002), blue-fronted Ama-
zons, Amazona aestival (De Mendonca-Furtado and Ottoni
2008), and pigeons, Columba livia (Schmidt and Cook
2006), are less adept. By contrast, ravens, Corvus corax,
and crows, C. corone, C. cornix, are capable of solving
more complicated crossed support tasks (Albiach-Serrano
et al. 2012; Bagotskaya et al. 2012), yet these corvids, in
contrast to great apes, Gorilla gorilla, Pan paniscus, P.
troglodytes, Pongo abelii, do not appear to comprehend the
causal principles of such problems (Albiach-Serrano et al.
2012; Bagotskaya et al. 2012). The most convincing evi-
dence that parrots are capable of comprehending the causal
principles underlying means-end problems has been
demonstrated by keas, Nestor notabilis, in which one of six
individuals showed spontaneous success by pulling a
continuous, rather than disrupted, wooden slat to retrieve
an otherwise out-of-reach food reward (Auersperg et al.
2009). Similar performances were also found in one of four
black-headed caiques, Pionites melanocephala, but not
among four red-shouldered macaws Diopsittaca nobilis,
presented with continuous or disrupted strips of cloth that
were either connected or disconnected to a reward (van
Horik and Emery unpublished observations).
Trap-Table (Povinelli 2000), Two-Trap-Tube (Seed
et al. 2006) and Trap-Barrier (Martin-Ordas et al. 2012)
tasks share similar functional properties. In these tasks, the
subject must avoid a trap or barrier to access a food reward.
However, only a few individuals have been successful on
these problems. In species that naturally use tools in the
wild, such as chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, individuals
rarely succeed at the Trap-Table task (Povinelli 2000) but
show greater success on modified Trap-Table problems
when they could choose where to insert a single tool on a
binary problem, rather than when choosing between two
previously inserted tools (Girndt et al. 2008) and when
using their fingers, rather than tools, to move a reward on a
similar Two-Trap-Box task (Seed et al. 2009). However,
species that do not naturally use tools in the wild, such as
hoolock gibbons, Hylobates hoolock (Cunningham et al.
2006), and vervet monkeys, Chlorocebus pygerythrus
(Santos et al. 2006), also show capacities to solve the Trap-
Table task, although tamarins, Saguinus Oedipus (Santos
et al. 2006), and capuchin monkeys, Cebus apaella (Fujita
et al. 2003), failed. Similar findings have been found
among tool-using and non-tool-using corvids on a Trap-
Tube task (Seed et al. 2006; Tebbich et al. 2007; Taylor
et al. 2009), whereas numerous species of parrots fail
similar tasks (Liedtke et al. 2010).
Due to their functional similarities, Trap tasks have also
been used to assess the ability to transfer previously
learned information across novel problems. Great apes,
however, failed to generalise information across the Trap-
Table and Trap-Tube problems (Martin-Ordas et al. 2008),
although in a similar task, apes previously exposed to trap
or barrier platforms outperformed subjects that initially
received a non-obstacle platform (Martin-Ordas et al.
2012). Only New Caledonian crows, Corvus moneduloides,
that previously solved a Two-Trap-Tube task could solve a
Trap-Table transfer task, while those that failed to solve the
Two-Trap-Tube task also failed the Trap-Table task
(Taylor et al. 2009). However, as presentation order of
these tasks were not counterbalanced across subjects, it
remains difficult to interpret whether successful birds
solved these problems by generalising causally relevant
principles across the different tasks.
Assessing different capacities to comprehend the
underlying causal relationships between objects may help
reveal the selection pressures that drive the evolution of
cognition (van Horik et al. 2012). The majority of physical
cognition tasks are, however, based around tool-using
paradigms, possibly because research on physical cognition
has typically focused on species that frequently use tools in
the wild, such as the great apes (Povinelli 2000; Tomasello
and Call 1997). Yet species that do not naturally use tools
also show capacities for physical cognition when tested in
captivity. For example, vervet monkeys which do not
regularly use tools in the wild outperformed tool-using
chimpanzees on a Trap-Table task (Povinelli 2000; Santos
et al. 2006). Moreover, corvids which do not use tools in
the wild, such as rooks (Bird and Emery 2009a, b; Seed
et al. 2006), show capacities for physical cognition that
rival corvids that do frequently use tools in the wild, such
as New Caledonian crows (Taylor et al. 2009; Weir et al.
2002) and possibly great apes (Hanus et al. 2011; Mendes
et al. 2007). As such, habitual tool users do not currently
appear to possess greater capacities for physical cognition
than non-tool-using species.
Successful performances of both tool-using and non-
tool-using species on some means-end tasks may, however,
be facilitated by simple perceptual cues experienced during
training. As such, subjects may solve these tasks without
possessing any causal understanding of the problem. In
some studies for example (Auersperg et al. 2009; Cun-
ningham et al. 2006; Irie-Sugimoto et al. 2008), subjects
were initially provided with training on a continuous sur-
face (i.e. without a trap), or with continuous (i.e. unbroken)
materials, before being presented with traps or non-func-
tional materials that are disconnected to the reward. Hence,
individuals may solve the task through previously learnt
associations between the reward and the continuous surface
or materials, rather than by understanding the causal
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properties of traps and connectivity (but see Povinelli
2000). Paradigms that preclude the use of such perceptual
cues, by using novel transfer tasks that manipulate causal
rules associated with object relationships, may therefore
better illuminate differences in physical cognition and
facilitate more accurate comparisons across species.
Due to their large relative brain sizes (Iwaniuk et al.
2005) and other socio-ecological traits shared with corvids
and great apes, such as complex sociality (Hobson et al.
2014), dexterity required for omnivorous extractive for-
aging, and protracted developmental period and lifespan,
parrots may reveal similar capacities for physical cognition
(van Horik and Emery 2011; van Horik et al. 2012). In the
current study, we investigate whether two species of non-
tool-using parrots show capacities for physical cognition
when tested on a means-end problem that lacks similar
perceptual cues experienced during training. To do this, we
introduce a new means-end transfer paradigm that allevi-
ates the training biases which may promote learned per-
ceptual rules and limit interpretations drawn from previous
studies. We designed a Trap-Gaps problem to investigate
whether red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques
can generalise learned rules about object relationships
across novel problems. We assess whether subjects can
discriminate between pulling food trays through gaps while
attending to the respective width of the gaps and the size of
the trays. Subjects were presented with two tasks in a
counterbalanced order: one in which the size of the gaps
varied, but the size of the trays remained constant, and
another task where the size of the trays varied, but the size
of the gaps remained constant. Hence, subjects could learn
about the relationships between objects through trial-and-
error associative learning in the first task, but potentially
solve the second task spontaneously if they transferred




Four red-shouldered macaws: No. 2, No. 4, No. 5 and No.
8, and four black-headed caiques: Green, Gold, Purple and
Red (hereafter macaws and caiques), participated in this
study. All subjects, with the exception of No. 4, were male.
Subjects were hand-reared and each species were from at
least two different clutches. Individuals from each species
were 33 months old when tested and housed according to
species in indoor aviaries (2 m3) under identical
conditions.
Subjects had prior experience with a number of tasks
employing object manipulation, including removing food
hidden under different coloured lids (van Horik and Emery
unpublished data). At nine months of age, subjects were
also presented with 100 trials on a means-end connected
task, where they were required to discriminate between
pulling vertical pieces of white cloth (25 mm
wide 9 160 mm long) that were either continuous, and
hence connected to a distal reward, or separated by a
15-mm gap. One caique (Gold) made 9 correct choices on
his first 10 trails (van Horik and Emery unpublished data).
Subjects, however, had no prior experience with pulling
trays through gaps, or the any of the materials, colours,
strings or trays used in the current experiment. Both species
were raised under identical conditions and provided with
equal experiences. Food and water were provided that
ad libitum and subjects’ participation was voluntary, i.e.
they were not forced to engage with the test apparatus but
did so of their own volition.
Materials
(a) Training task
Subjects were presented with two identical opaque green
trays (55 mm diameter 9 20 mm deep), each attached to a
200-mm-long green string and positioned out of the sub-
jects’ reach at the distal end of a partitioned A4 letter tray
(Fig. 1). The letter tray was fixed to the outside of the
testing arena, and only one tray was baited with a clearly
visible food reward. While the trays were opaque, they
were wide and shallow. Hence, the rewards were not
concealed and the contents of each tray remained clearly
visible to subjects at all times. Either tray could be
retrieved by pulling their respective string, but subjects
were required to discriminate between pulling strings that
were attached to a rewarded rather than an unrewarded
tray. Subjects were not presented with gaps during training
trials.
(b) Gaps task
Two identical opaque yellow trays (60 mm diame-
ter 9 20 mm deep), both baited with equal quantities of
clearly visible food rewards, were positioned in the same
location as above. A 200-mm-long green string was
attached to each tray, allowing the trays to be pulled
towards the cage (Fig. 1). To retrieve the food reward,
subjects were required to discriminate between two dif-
ferent sized gaps. One gap (70 mm wide 9 50 mm high)
was large enough to allow the passage of the tray, whereas
the other gap (50 mm wide 9 50 mm high) restricted
access to the tray. Both gaps were positioned 170 mm from
the subject, with the trays placed approximately 30 mm
behind the gaps.
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(c) Trays task
Two gaps of equal size (65 mm wide 9 50 mm high)
were positioned as above. Two baited blue trays, one large
(75 mm diameter, 20 mm deep) and one small (55 mm
diameter 9 20 mm deep), were baited as above. Apart
from their size, both trays were identical. The gaps allowed
passage of the small tray but restricted access to the large
tray.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a familiar aviary that
was visually isolated from other individuals. Subjects were
initially presented with the training apparatus, requiring
them to discriminate between rewarded and non-rewarded
trays, and then subsequently tested on the Trays and Gaps
tasks (Fig. 1). All trays were opaque, but their contents
clearly visible to the subjects. Each apparatus was posi-
tioned outside of the aviary, behind a clear Plexiglas bar-
rier, with the strings initially out of the subject’s reach.
After baiting the trays with a clearly visible food reward of
crushed orange Lafeber Nutri-BerriesTM, the experimenter
then waited until the subject was within 10 cm of the
apparatus before administering a 5-s delay to allow the
subject time to view, but not access, the baited tray. Both
strings were then simultaneously presented, so that they
protruded under the Plexiglas barrier and were within the
subjects reach. Subjects were only allowed one attempt per
trial to pull a string and were considered to have made a
correct choice if they retrieved the reward. The first sting
that the subject picked up, with either their bill or foot, was
scored as a choice. Subjects always retrieved the rewarded
tray after pulling the correct string, whereas the incorrect
(but still baited) tray always remained inaccessible. The
apparatus was removed after subjects pulled either a cor-
rect or incorrect string and rebaited for subsequent trials.
Subjects received a maximum of 10 trials per day. The
location of the accessible reward was pseudo-randomised
so that it did not occur on the same side for more than two
consecutive trials. Trials were recorded with a digital
camcorder (JVC Everio, Model No. GZ-MG645BEK,
Malaysia), and the outcome of each trial was coded live via
the camcorder’s monitor. During trials, the experimenter’s
hands were placed behind his back. A random selection of
10 % of all trials (N = 126) were independently recoded
by a naı¨ve observer (A. Hulatt) to determine inter-observer
reliability ratings of videos, revealing 100 % agreement.
(a) Training: discriminating between rewarded and
unrewarded trays
To proceed to the test condition, subjects were required
to choose the baited tray for 7 consecutive trials in one
block of 10 trials. After reaching criterion, subjects pro-
ceeded to the test condition on the following day. Subjects
were considered to have developed a side bias if they chose
the same side in six or more trials. To correct for side
biases, the non-preferred side was consistently baited until
the subject retrieved the reward over two consecutive trials.
The presentation order then resumed to its original pseudo-
randomised configuration. Errors from side bias corrective
trials were included in the training analyses.
(b) Learning and transfer
After subjects mastered the training phase, they were
provided with the Gaps and Trays tasks in a counterbal-
anced order. That is, after training to discriminate rewarded
from non-rewarded trays, half of the test subjects pro-
ceeded with the Trays task, whereas the other half pro-
ceeded with the Gaps task. Individuals from each species
Fig. 1 Trap-Gaps Training and Test apparatus (not to scale). Food-reward trays (F) can be pulled towards the subject via a green string. Subjects
commence with the training phase then proceed with the Trays or Gaps tasks in a counterbalanced order
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were pseudo-randomly assigned to each task order. The
first task that each subject experienced was considered an
‘‘initial learning task’’, in which subjects could learn the
relationship between the trays and barriers. Subjects were
then required to reach a predetermined learning criterion of
either 7 consecutive, or 9 out of 10, correct choices in one
block of 10 trials before participating in the subsequent
‘‘transfer’’ task. Two learning criterions were used in an
attempt to maintain subjects’ interest in interacting with
each apparatus. Side biases were corrected, as above, using
the training apparatus. Corrective trials, using the training
apparatus, were not included in subsequent analyses.
Testing ceased if a subject failed to reach criteria on their
initial task within 200 trials, or if subjects failed to reach
the transfer task criteria with 100 trials. To determine
whether subjects retained previously learned information,
subjects that reached criteria on each task were subse-
quently re-tested with one additional block of 10 trials on
their initial task.
Statistical analysis
We used Mann–Whitney U tests to compare the number of
errors and trials that each group made before successfully
reaching the training criterion. Exact tests were reported
following Mundry and Fischer (1998) to accommodate
analysis of our small sample size. Retrospectively, through
processes of enumeration, we determined a probability of
P = 0.02 that a given subject would meet the above
learning criteria within one 10-trial session. To do this, we
summed the number of possible successful combinations
that could be made in one 10-trial session (i.e. 20 combi-
nations of reaching at least seven consecutive correct
choices in 10 trials, plus four combinations of nine correct
choices out of 10 trials) and divided this by the total
number of possible choices (i.e. 24 successful combina-
tions out of 1024 possible choices, i.e. each of the ten trials
in a given session presents 2 options). As the learning
criterion was assessed repeatedly across sessions, we
assigned each subject with a cumulative probability of
success to account for the increased likelihood of success
due to multiple testing. Each subject’s probability of suc-
cess was therefore weighted by the number of sessions it
required to either reach criterion, or by the total number of
sessions a subject participated in before testing ceased (cf
Grant 1946). Cumulative probabilities were then used to
determine Chi-squared values for each successful subject.
The summed Chi-squared values were then tested against
the summed degrees of freedom (all 1-tailed) using Fishers
methods (Sokal and Rohlf 1995; pp 734) and used to
determine an overall probability that the successful per-
formances of subjects differed significantly from chance.
Results
Training: discriminating between rewarded
and unrewarded trays
Five of eight subjects chose the correct side on their first
trial of the training task. There were no significant between
species differences in the number of errors made (macaws
median = 10, range = 4–23; caiques median = 5,
range = 0–17; Mann–Whitney U test, U = 5.0, N1 = 4,
N2 = 4, P = 0.49), or number of trials (macaws med-
ian = 29, range = 18–77; caiques median = 23,
range = 7–49; Mann–Whitney U test, U = 7, N1 = 4,
N2 = 4, P = 0.89), to reach the initial training criterion.
Two individuals from each species were therefore ran-
domly assigned to receive trials commencing with either
task. There were no significant differences in errors (Trays
task median = 11, range = 5–16; Gaps task median = 5,
range = 0–13: Mann–Whitney U test, U = 2.5, N1 = 4,
N2 = 4, P = 0.14), or trials (Trays task median = 38,
range = 18–77; Gaps task median = 19, range = 7–40;
Mann–Whitney U test, U = 3.5, N1 = 4, N2 = 4,
P = 0.20), to reach the training criterion between these
two groups. However, due to limitations of a small sample
size these comparisons are likely to suffer from low power,
and hence, any differences between these groups may be
difficult to reveal. During training, two macaws, No. 2 and
No. 5, developed side biases in sessions 3 and 1, respec-
tively, which were included in subsequent analyses of
training performances.
Learning and transfer
Four of eight subjects (No. 4, No. 5, No. 8 and Purple)
chose the correct side on their first trial in the initial task,
while five (No. 2, No. 4, No. 5, Gold and Red) of six
subjects were correct on their first transfer task trial.
Although the cumulative probability of success in Task 1
failed to reach statistical significance (v2 = 25.86,
DF = 16, P = 0.06), suggesting that the initial learning
criteria were not rigorous enough, subjects’ performances
differed significantly from chance in Task 2 (v2 = 26.67,
DF = 12, P = 0.009) and in Task 1b (v2 = 30.03,
DF = 8, P = 0.0002) when they were retested on a further
10 trials of their initial learning task. Subjects frequently
developed side biases throughout testing. Side biases were
formed during the following sessions: No. 2: Task 1 Ses-
sion 1, Task 2 Session 3; No. 4: Task 1 Sessions 2, 3, 4;
Green: Task 1 Sessions 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 14; Red: Task 1
Sessions 2, 7; No. 5: Task 1 Sessions 1, 2, 4; No. 8: Task 1
Sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 17, 21, 22; Gold: Task 1
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Sessions 1, 2, Task 2 Sessions 2, 4; and Purple: Task 1
Sessions 3, 9, 10, 12, 16.
(a) Trays task
All four subjects that commenced with the Trays task
reached the criterion to transfer to the second task (median
errors: 38.50, range = 20–64; median trials: 90.00, range
45–134; Table 1). Only No. 4 and Red reached our criteria
in the transfer condition. While No. 4 demonstrated similar
performances on both tasks, when re-tested on the initial
task this subject immediately reached criteria by choosing
the correct tray on all 10 trials.
Only one subject’s performance (Red) suggested
capacities to generalise previously learned relationships
across novel, but functionally equivalent, problems. Red
spontaneously reached our learning criteria on the transfer
task, choosing the correct side for its first nine out of 10
trials. Red again reached criteria when retested on the first
task, successfully choosing the correct tray on all 10 trials.
(b) Gaps task
Only No. 5 and Gold reached criteria on the Gaps task
(median errors: 17.00, range = 10–24; median trials:
49.50, range 32–67; Table 1). Two birds, No. 8 and
Purple, failed to reach the initial task criteria within 200
trials and were therefore not presented with the transfer
task. Although Gold rapidly reached criteria on its first
task, it made twice as many errors on the transfer task.
While No. 5 reached criteria with fewer errors than the
initial task, both No. 5 and Gold failed to reach criteria
when retested on a further 10 trials of the initial Gaps
task.
Discussion
Red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques suc-
cessfully learned to solve a means-end problem that
required an ability to discriminate between pulling baited
trays through gaps, while attending to the respective width
of the gaps or size of the trays. The performances of one
subject, when presented with a subsequent transfer task,
may also suggest that some parrots are capable of retaining
causally relevant information about object relations and
then using this experience to generalise information across
a novel, but functionally equivalent, problems.
While all subjects learned to discriminate rewarded
from unrewarded trays during the training phase, of the
eight subjects tested, three macaws and three caiques
learned to solve their initial presentation of the Trap-Gaps
task. Yet, subjects’ performances varied considerably,
suggesting that the ability to discriminate between the size
relationships of the trays and gaps required trial-and-error
experience and may be a particularly difficult problem for
these parrots to comprehend. While all four subjects that
commenced with the Trays task learned to solve the
problem, only two subjects solved the initial presentation
of the Gaps task. As such, the ability to discriminate
between different sized gaps may be more challenging than
discriminating between different sized trays. These find-
ings may, however, be due to the experience that subjects
received during training, which required attending to
rewarded and unrewarded trays in the absence of gaps.
Hence, the different sized gaps may have been a less salient
feature of the task than the different sized trays. These
findings may also explain why many species struggle with
Table 1 Number of errors and
trials to reach criterion for the
training phase and groups
commencing with the Trays task
and then transferring to the
Gaps task and vice versa
Training Learning Transfer Retest
Subjects Food Discrimination Task 1: Trays Task 2: Gaps Task 1b: Trays
Errors Trials Errors Trials Errors Trials Errors Trials
No. 2 23 77 20 47 ?33 ?100 N/A N/A
No. 4 6 18 20 45 21 68 0* 10
Green 17 49 64 134 ?51 ?100 N/A N/A
Red 5 27 57 133 0* 9 0* 10
Task 1: Gaps Task 2: Trays Task 1b: Gaps
No. 5 13 40 24 67 11 38 5 10
No. 8 4 18 ?90 ?200 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Gold 0 7 10 32 20 46 3 10
Purple 5 19 ?93 ?200 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Task 1b shows the number of errors that subjects made when retested on a further 10 trials of their initial
task. Cells denoted by a ‘‘?’’ indicate that individuals failed to reach criterion within the corresponding
number of errors; ‘‘N/A’’ indicates that subjects were not presented with the transfer task; and ‘‘*’’ indicates
that subjects performed significantly above chance within 10 trials (P\ 0.01). Note that Red participated in
10 trials in Task 2, only making its first error on the 10th trial
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the Trap-Tube and Trap-Table tasks as they have to attend
to a gap removed from the goal object. In contrast, to solve
the Trays task subjects have to attend to the goal object
itself. The colour of the trays and the reward, crushed
orange Nutriberries, may have also been more conspicuous
in the Trays task, where the trays were blue, rather than in
the Gaps task where yellow trays were used. However, the
contents of each tray were clearly visible and subjects
rapidly succeeded in discriminating rewarded from unre-
warded green trays. While the trays differed in colour
between the training and test conditions, the similar size of
the training task trays and the small (accessible) Trays task
tray may have also facilitated subjects’ performances on
this task. Future studies may therefore benefit by increasing
the size differences between the trays in each condition.
To test whether subjects solved the initial task through
perceptual cues, or whether they showed a causal under-
standing of object relations, we presented the six birds that
successfully learnt to solve the initial task, three macaws
and three caiques, with a novel, but functionally equiva-
lent, transfer task. Four of six subjects reached criterion
within 100 trials on the transfer task. One macaw made less
than half as many errors on the transfer task than the initial
task and one caique spontaneously reached criterion with-
out making any errors. The remaining two birds took
considerably longer to reach criteria on the transfer task
than compared to their initial performances. As subjects’
overall performances on the initial task failed to differ
significantly from chance, it remains possible that those
successful individuals, that reached our predetermined
learning criteria, did so without adequately learning the
affordances of the problem. Subjects’ performances on the
transfer task may therefore have improved by introducing a
more stringent learning criterion during the initial tasks.
While spontaneous success on the transfer task may sug-
gest that at least one subject possessed a causal under-
standing of the relations between trays and gaps, it remains
possible that subjects’ performances on the transfer task
were facilitated by simple perceptual cues learnt during
their exposure to the first task. For example, subjects might
learn that trays partially occluded by the barrier were
inaccessible. While the apparatus was presented in full
view, and subjects could clearly see behind the 50-mm-
high barriers, this relatively simple associative rule, to
choose the fully visible tray, may therefore be sufficient to
solve this task. Future studies may therefore consider
manipulating such perspectives to include conditions in
which the larger tray, or the tray behind the small gap, is
placed at further distances to keep the visual cues available
to the subjects comparable.
The fact that most subjects learnt to solve the initial
task, but failed to rapidly solve the transfer task suggests
that subjects may have learnt to attend to only one
dimension of each problem, i.e. the size of the trays or the
size of the gaps, rather than the combined relation between
the trays and gaps. As such, rather than generalising rules
across tasks, subjects may have been confronted with an
object-relation reversal task, which may require additional
trials to unlearn the first rule and then subsequently learn
the new rule. After learning each rule independently, (a) to
choose the small tray and (b) to choose the large gap, the
poor performances of two subjects on the retest of Task 1
(i.e. Task 1b) may therefore suggest that they were
attempting to generalise a new rule to solve the initial
problem, rather than reverting to the initially learnt rule.
Unlike the numerous species of parrots that failed to solve
Trap-Tube problems (Liedtke et al. 2010), the macaws and
caiques in the current study, like rooks (Seed et al. 2006),
may have successfully solved their initial task by applying
a procedural rule based on an arbitrary cue, such as
attending to the size of the trays in relation to the size of the
gaps. The ability to recall learned procedural rules may,
however, also be a particularly efficient approach to solv-
ing repeatedly encountered problems. As such, two of the
four subjects re-tested on a further ten trials of their initial
task solved the problem without making any errors.
Red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques nat-
urally forage in the forest canopy (Juniper and Parr 2003),
and an understanding of distal object relations, for example
when pulling branchlets containing berries or seeds
towards themselves, may provide a selective advantage if it
enhances an individual’s foraging efficiency. Evidence to
suggest that parrots possess capacities for complex physical
cognition, comparable to other relatively large brained
birds and mammals, is growing (van Horik et al. 2012). As
such, parrots have been observed to spontaneously make
stick-tools in captivity (Auersperg et al. 2012) and may
comprehend physical concepts of objects such as func-
tionality and connectivity (Auersperg et al. 2009) due to
their motivation to manipulate and explore inanimate
objects (Auersperg et al. 2015). In contrast to the unsuc-
cessful performances of parrots on some physical cognition
tasks (Liedtke et al. 2010), findings from the current study
bolster support for complex physical cognition among non-
tool-using parrots. While the current study is constrained
by a small sample size and possible procedural concerns,
our findings suggest that the Trap-Gaps paradigm may be a
particularly useful approach for assessing physical cogni-
tion among a broad variety of both tool-using and non-tool-
using species. Moreover, the Trap-Gaps paradigm refines
previous means-end and Trap-Table paradigms, as the
training procedures do not confound interpretations of the
experimental trials by previously rewarding a continuous
string or platform.
By removing some of the perceptually learned cues that
subjects experience during training procedures in previous
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mean-end tasks, the Trap-Gaps transfer paradigm, pre-
sented in the current study, may provide an additional
method to clarify whether tool-using and non-tool-using
species with large relative brain sizes possess similar
capacities for physical cognition. Findings from the current
study suggest that parrots, like corvids (Seed et al. 2006;
Taylor et al. 2009) and great apes (Martin-Ordas et al.
2008, 2012), may possess capacities to solve complicated
means-end problems by generalising previously learned
experiences to help solve novel problems.
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